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Abstract 
Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have often 
employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to 
such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept 
refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing compliance with these 
agreements once they are in place. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which 
parties to an agreement finance an independent monitor who audits the compliance 
performance of the members of an agreement. These audits reveal instances of 
noncompliance so they can be sanctioned. We find that costly monitoring of compliance 
limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the 
environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will often involve greater 
participation than IEAs that do not require costly monitoring. Consequently, costly 
monitoring of IEAs can produce higher international environmental quality. Moreover, 
under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly 
monitoring. 
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1 Introduction 
 
International environmental agreements (IEAs) made between sovereign nations 
seeking to manage shared environmental and natural resources are susceptible to two 
sources of free riding. First, because participation with IEAs is voluntary, countries can 
decide at will whether to become a party to an agreement. If an IEA only requires a 
subset of countries to join before entering into force, as is typically the case, incentives 
exist for some countries to stay out of the agreement and free ride off the provision of 
the cooperating others. Second, if compliance with the terms of the agreement is not 
properly enforced, parties to an IEA will have an incentive to violate the terms of the 
agreement and free ride off those countries that do comply. Previous theoretical 
analyses of IEAs have focused on the impact the first form of free riding has on the 
effectiveness of IEAs, while avoiding altogether the possibility that member countries 
may not fully comply with their commitments. In this paper, we deal directly with the 
issue of noncompliance within IEAs by constructing and analyzing a game in which 
parties to an IEA finance an independent monitor who audits, with some endogenous 
probability, the compliance performance of individual members. 
 
All effective international agreements must include costly compliance monitoring. For 
example, the Implementation Committee of the Montreal Protocol is responsible for 
gathering compliance information about countries that are suspected to be in violation of 
the Protocol (Benedick 1998).2 Likewise, the Compliance Committee, one of the 
institutions constructed to enforce compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, is designed to 
monitor the compliance behavior of signatory countries and then report their findings to 
the Enforcement Branch, which has the power to impose sanctions (UNFCC 2002). The 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) makes a similar 
provision for monitoring for compliance through the Standing Committee, its own 
management body responsible for enforcement. The enforcement provisions included in 
CITES and the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols allow their respective management bodies 
to monitor a party’s behavior only when it is suspected to be violating the treaty. In 
contrast, the International Whaling Commission, the management body appointed under 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, established the International 
Observers Scheme to monitor signatories’ behavior. This policy required member 
countries to each appoint observers and finance monitoring activities on a rotating 
basis. Although the design of monitoring and enforcement institutions differ across 
international agreements, each share the common characteristic that the cost of 
monitoring activities must be bourn by the parties themselves. 
 
Despite the fact that costly monitoring for compliance must be part of any international 
agreement, theoretical analyses of IEAs usually assume that compliance can be 
enforced without cost. In the literature IEAs are often analyzed using the equilibrium 
concept of a self-enforcing agreement. A self-enforcing agreement made between 
agents is defined as a single coalition of cooperating agents from which no member of 
the coalition wishes to withdraw (the coalition is internally stable) and no non-member 
wishes to join (the coalition is externally stable). This definition of coalitional stability 
was first proposed by D’Aspremont et al. (1983) for their analysis of cartel stability. 
Barrett (1994) appears to have been the first to apply it to the analysis of international 
environmental relations. However, the term self-enforcing is a bit misleading, because it 
does not address the problem of enforcing the compliance of the members of a 
cooperative agreement. Most authors who use this equilibrium concept simply assume 
that parties to a self-enforcing IEA comply fully with the terms of the agreement (e.g. 
Hoel 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, 1998; Barrett 1994, 2003; Kolstad 2007).7 
Barrett (1994) and Finus and Rundshagen (1998) have examined enforcement 
mechanisms for IEAs. They focus on renegotiation-proof punishment strategies with 
which parties to an agreement sanction violators by jointly reducing their provision of 
international environmental quality in the future. 
 
We take a different approach to the study of compliance and enforcement of IEAs that is 
motivated by the costly monitoring activities that are part of established international 
agreements. We maintain the concept of a self-enforcing agreement to determine the 
equilibrium number of parties to an IEA. However, to counteract the incentive that 
parties have to violate the terms of an IEA, they finance and empower an independent 
body with the power to monitor their compliance behavior. Parties to an IEA that are 
monitored and deemed in violation of the agreement incur a costly sanction. We 
consider two types of sanctions—one in which an enforcement body imposes a financial 
sanction on detected violations, and the other in which detected violators, as well as 
those who choose not to participate in an IEA, face a costly deterioration of their 
reputation as cooperative members of the international community. 
 
Our efforts yield several new results. First, the range of international environmental 
problems within which a welfare-improving self-enforcing IEA can form is smaller when 
monitoring is necessary and costly. This follows because monitoring increases the cost 
of cooperation, which in turn limits the set of situations under which a treaty can actually 
increase international welfare. Second, when an IEA is expected to form, it will often 
have more members when the parties must pay for compliance monitoring. This occurs 
because the additional cost of being a party to an IEA must be offset with an increase in 
the level of environmental quality, which is realized through an increase in the number 
of parties to the agreement. As a result, costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher 
environmental quality. In addition, provided that the number of potential parties to an 
agreement is sufficiently large, social welfare can be greater under an IEA that is costly 
to monitor. Finally, we find that our principal results are accentuated when compliance 
monitoring is not perfectly accurate. That is, monitoring errors further reduce the set of 
situations in which multilateral cooperation is welfare enhancing and thus limit the 
opportunities for an IEA to form. However, when an agreement does form, monitoring 
inaccuracy can generate higher participation and environmental quality. 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. After presenting a basic model of a self-
enforcing IEA in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we extend the model to allow for noncompliance and 
assume that parties to a self-enforcing IEA finance an independent monitor who checks 
on their compliance choices and applies a financial sanction in cases of detected 
noncompliance. Section 4 contains the principal results of our work. In this section we 
derive the consequences of costly monitoring of IEAs on the value of international 
cooperation, the circumstances under which a welfare-improving IEA will form, and the 
self-enforcing number of members of an IEA. In Sect. 5 we analyze the effects of costly 
monitoring on global welfare. In Sect. 6 we consider an alternative model in which IEA 
violators, as well as those who do not participate in the agreement, suffer a costly loss 
in reputation. We conclude in Sect. 7. 
 
2 The Basic Model of a Self-enforcing IEA 
 
In this section, we present a standard model of a self-enforcing IEA—one that does not 
require enforcement—to review the structure of these games and to provide a baseline 
for determining the effects of costly compliance monitoring on the outcomes of these 
games. For simplicity, throughout our analysis countries make a discrete choice 
whether to abate their emissions. Although a model with continuous abatement choice 
would allow for more general results, the discrete choice model has been adopted in a 
number of previous studies because of its tractability. Thus, following Barrett (2003); 
Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007), consider a situation where N identical countries each 
emit a uniformly mixed transboundary pollutant. Country i ’s welfare is 
 
(1)     
where qi is equal to one if i abates its emissions and zero if it does not, q−i is the sum of 
the abatement decisions made by all other countries, b is the constant benefit of 
abatement by i or any other country, c is the constant individual cost of abatement, and 
A is a positive constant. Assume that b < c so that no country will unilaterally abate its 
emissions, but that Nb > c so that the countries’ joint welfare will be maximized when 
they all abate their emissions. 
 
Recognizing the benefits from agreeing to control their emissions, countries have the 
incentive to form an IEA to do so. As in Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007), the formation of 
an IEA is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each country must decide 
independently whether to become a party to an IEA. Assume that countries have 
complete information regarding each others’ welfare functions and that they can form 
only a single cooperative coalition. In the second stage, all countries choose whether to 
abate their emissions. Countries that become members of an IEA in the first stage 
commit to decisions in the second stage that maximize their joint welfare, given the 
decisions of the non-member nations. In this section we assume perfect compliance 
with the agreement so that members of the IEA do not have to be monitored for 
compliance. While the parties to an IEA carry through on their commitments to 
maximize their joint welfare in the second stage, nonmember countries maximize their 
individual welfare. Since the individual cost of abatement outweighs the benefit for each 
country (i.e., b < c), all countries that are not members of an IEA will decide to not abate 
their emissions in the second stage. 
 
Given the decision of all non-member countries to not abate their emissions, the 
members of an IEA will abate their emissions in the second stage as long as the 
coalition is profitable in the sense that each member of the coalition is at least as well 
off as when all countries choose not to control their emissions. Let s denote the number 
of parties to an IEA who all agree to abate their emissions. Moreover, let wp(s) denote 
the welfare of each of the parties to the IEA and let wnp(s) denote the welfare of each of 
the countries that are not party to the agreement. Throughout the paper the superscript 
p signals that the country in question is a party to an IEA, while the superscript np 
signals that the country is not a party to the agreement. From (1) we have: 
 
(2)     
 
Since b < c, Nb > c, and wp(s) is increasing in s, there exist coalition sizes that are 
strictly greater than one and weakly less than N that are profitable. The smallest of 
these profitable coalitions is 
 
(3)     
 
Throughout, the superscript nc denotes values when the decisions of the members of 
an IEA do not require costly monitoring (i.e., compliance is assumed perfect). If s ≥ snc 
min from the first stage of the game, the members of the coalition will agree to abate 
their emissions in the second stage of the game. If s < snc min, the members of the IEA 
maximize their joint welfare by not abating their emissions in the second stage. 
 
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is called a self-enforcing agreement in the 
IEA literature. Intuitively, a self-enforcing agreement is one for which no party to the 
agreement wants to leave the agreement and no non-party wishes to join. More 
formally: 
 
Definition 1 An IEA consisting of s countries that comply with the agreement without 
the need for costly monitoring is self-enforcing if and only if: 
 
(4)    
 
Requirement (i ) is that the agreement is internally stable in the sense that no party has 
an incentive to leave a self-enforcing agreement. Requirement (ii) is that the agreement 
is externally stable in the sense that no non-party wishes to join the IEA. The only 
internally stable coalition is the one with s = snc min members. To see why, note that for 
s > snc min, (2) reveals that wp(s) ≥ wnp(s − 1) implies b ≥ c, which violates our 
assumption that b < c. On the other hand, an IEA with sncmin members is internally 
stable, because if one member of the coalition defected then the remaining members 
would find it unprofitable to abate their emissions. The defector’s welfare (as well as 
every other country’s welfare) would then be wnp(0), which is weakly less than wp(snc 
min). Finally, an IEA with snc min members is also externally stable. Using requirement 
(ii) and the welfare functions (2), wnp(sncmin) ≥ wp(snc min +1) implies b ≤ c,which is 
satisfied because b < c. Since an agreement consisting of snc min members is the only 
internally and externally stable coalition size, it is the equilibrium number of members of 
a self-enforcing IEA. 
 
Proposition 1 Let the equilibrium number of members of a self-enforcing agreement 
that does not require costly monitoring be snc. Then, snc is the smallest profitable 
coalition; that is, 
 
(5)     
 
The equilibrium number of members of an IEA that does not require costly monitoring is 
unique, strictly greater than 1, and weakly less than N. Note that [5] indicates that 
participation with an IEA is increasing in the cost of abatement, c, and decreasing in the 
individual benefit of abatement, b. Thus, Barrett’s (1994, 2003) claim that international 
cooperation to protect the environment will be greatest when it is needed least is easily 
verified. 
 
It is clear that the concept of a self-enforcing agreement applies to the stability of a 
cooperating coalition, not to the coalition members’ decisions to comply with the terms 
of the agreement once they have joined. Indeed, if countries are able to observe each 
others’ compliance decisions perfectly and without cost, then a member country has no 
incentive to join an agreement and then violate its requirements. If it did so all the other 
participating nations would observe this violation and would realize that they would be 
worse off if they continued to abate their emissions. Thus, under perfect information a 
member of a self-enforcing IEA would not violate the terms of the agreement because 
this would cause the agreement to collapse. 
 
In reality, however, nations are not able to observe the compliance behavior of others 
so easily. Under imperfect information about individual nations’ compliance behavior, a 
country may be motivated to join an agreement and then decide to violate its terms. If 
the other participating countries do not observe this act of noncompliance, they will not 
automatically respond by refusing to abate their emissions. The violator may then be 
able to escape the cost of compliance while enjoying the benefit of cooperation of those 
that continue to abate their emissions. 
 
To demonstrate the incentive parties have to violate the terms of the IEA under 
imperfect information regarding compliance behavior, assume that a member of an IEA 
with s members can fail to abate its emissions without being detected. If the party 
chooses to be noncompliant and the other member countries continue to abate their 
emissions because they cannot observe this violation, the violator’s payoff is wnp(s−1) = 
A+b(s−1). If it instead remained compliant its payoff is wp(s) = A + bs − c. Subtracting 
wnp(s − 1) from wp(s) yields b −c, which is negative by assumption indicating that 
member countries always have an incentive to violate an agreement as long as they 
believe that the other members are unable to observe their violation. However, with 
homogenous countries, each should expect that all the others will have the same 
motivation to violate an IEA as they do—if one member of an agreement has an 
incentive to violate an agreement, then all members do. Thus, under asymmetric 
information about countries’ abatement decisions and without monitoring to check on 
these decisions, no self-enforcing agreement exists (except for the trivial case of s = 0). 
This motivates the implementation of a monitoring mechanism to check on the 
compliance decisions of the members of an IEA and a sanction to punish detected 
violators. 
 
3 Self-enforcing IEAs when Compliance is Costly to Monitor 
 
We now modify the basic model of a self-enforcing IEA to give its members the 
opportunity to decide whether to comply with the terms of their agreement. We assume 
that members cannot observe each other’s compliance decisions and, therefore, each 
of them has an incentive to violate the requirements of the agreement in the absence of 
adequate monitoring. To counteract this incentive the parties of an IEA finance an 
independent monitor who audits their compliance decisions. A fixed sanction is applied 
when violations are detected. 
 
As before the model is analyzed as a stage game, but now the game has four stages.  
The first stage (membership stage) proceeds exactly as before; that is, each country 
chooses independently whether to join the IEA. In the second stage (treaty stage), 
members of the IEA jointly agree on whether to abate their emissions and, if they do 
agree to abate their emissions, each of them is required to contribute funds to the 
independent monitor. If IEA members jointly decide not to control their emissions in 
stage two, they do not fund the monitor, an effective IEA does not form, and the game 
ends. (Throughout, we refer to an effective IEA as one that actually leads to emissions 
control). If an effective IEA forms in stage two, all countries make their abatement 
decisions independently in stage three (abatement stage). Finally, in the fourth stage 
(enforcement stage) the monitor randomly audits the abatement decisions of member 
countries with the funding provided to it in the second stage, and a sanction is applied 
when the monitor finds a violation. Since the treaty, abatement, and enforcement stages 
are new with this study, we now describe them in detail. Because the game is solved by 
backward induction, we start with the last stage. 
 
3.1 Enforcement Stage 
 
If the game reaches this stage, an IEA with s members has formed, each member has 
agreed to abate their emissions, each member has contributed x dollars to fund the 
monitor, and all countries have made their abatement decisions. In the enforcement 
stage, the monitor randomly audits the abatement decisions of the IEA members with a 
probability that is an increasing function of the amount of funding the members 
contribute. Each additional dollar of funding allows the number of random audits to 
increase byα > 0; that is, α is the constant marginal productivity of resources devoted to 
monitoring. If s parties to an agreement each provide x to fund the monitor, then the 
number of random audits conducted is sxα, and the probability that any party is audited 
is 
 
(6)     
 
We will demonstrate shortly that an effective IEA will involve a monitoring probability in 
the half-closed interval (0, 1]. 
 
Monitoring of the countries’ compliance behavior, however, may be subject to a host of 
possible errors, including errors due to erroneous or missing data, reporting errors, and 
errors in evaluating available performance data. Given an audit, let ρ1 ∈ [0, 1) denote 
the probability that a compliant country is judged to be noncompliant (a Type I error), 
and let ρ2 ∈ [0, 1) denote the probability that a noncompliant country is judged to be 
compliant (a Type II error).These probabilities are common knowledge. 
 
In practice, there are a variety of ways noncompliant countries may be sanctioned. 
Much of our analysis in this regard is motivated by the enforcement mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol established under the Marrakesh Accords. These established an 
enforcement body (called the Compliance Committee) with the power to sanction 
noncompliant parties by reducing their greenhouse gas emissions quota for the next 
commitment period. Therefore, we assume that a party that is revealed to be 
noncompliant by the monitor incurs a known exogenous sanction of f . Others have 
criticized the enforcement strategy of the Kyoto Protocol as being non-credible (e.g. 
Barrett 2003), because a party to an IEA who decides not to abate its emissions could 
just as easily choose not to pay the sanction if its violation is discovered. Moreover, a 
party that is found to be in violation of the requirements of an IEA could simply leave the 
agreement. 
 
In Sect. 6 we consider another type of sanction that cannot be avoided so easily. There 
is strong agreement in the economic and political science literature that a party’s 
willingness to jointly manage transnational resources has value beyond a single treaty 
(Keohane 1986; Chayes andChayes 1991; Simmons 1998; Barrett 2003). Complying 
with international agreements builds a country’s reputation as a cooperating member of 
the international community, and that reputation allows it to be a part of other beneficial 
agreements. Chayes and Chayes (1991, p. 320) introduce the flip-side of this argument: 
“A reputation for unreliability cannot be confined to the area of activity in which it is 
earned. It is inevitable that a state’s defection from treaty rules will generate 
repercussions and linkages throughout the network of its relationships with others in the 
community. And these more diffuse responses can be calibrated more finely than formal 
sanctions.” We would add that if failing to comply with an IEA deteriorates a country’s 
reputation, then not participating with an agreement in first place is also likely to be 
damaging. In Sect. 6 we model sanctions for agreement violations and for non-
participation as costly reputation effects, and show that our qualitative conclusions 
about the impacts of costly monitoring on self-enforcing IEAs are largely preserved with 
this approach. 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Abatement Stage 
 
At this point in the game the members of an IEA have agreed to abate their emissions 
and have funded the monitor. In the abatement stage both members of an IEA and non-
members independently choose whether to control their emissions. Since the individual 
cost of abatement outweighs the individual benefit, each non-member will decide not to 
abate their emissions in this stage. Member countries, however, make this decision by 
comparing the expected cost of not complying with the agreement and the benefit of 
noncompliance. Assume that the parties to an IEA are risk neutral and that they comply 
if they are at least indifferent between compliance and noncompliance. Then, given an 
effective agreement consisting of s parties, in the abatement stage an individual country 
will comply if its expected welfare from doing so is not less than its expected welfare 
from noncompliance. Parties to the agreement cannot observe the others’ compliance 
choices, so one party’s violation of its commitment to abate its emissions will go 
unnoticed unless it is discovered by the monitor. Given the probability of an audit π, the 
probabilities of Type I and Type II monitoring errors ρ1 and ρ2, and the sanction f , it is 
straightforward to show that a party’s expected welfare from compliance is wp(s) − x − 
πρ1 f , while its expected welfare from noncompliance is wnp(s − 1) − x − π(1 − ρ2) f , 
where recall that wp(s) and wnp(s − 1) are defined by (2). Note that πρ1 f is a compliant 
party’s expected sanction when it is falsely judged to be noncompliant and π(1 − ρ1) f is 
a noncompliant party’s expected sanction from a correct determination that it is 
noncompliant.11 A party to an IEA complies with the terms of the agreement if and only 
if 
 
(7)    
 
Clearly, π f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ≥ (c − b) is a necessary condition for an effective IEA. If this 
condition did not hold, no party to an IEA would comply with its requirements and an 
effective agreement would not form. Note further that no amount of monitoring will be 
sufficient to induce compliance if f (1−ρ1−ρ2) < (c−b). This indicates that low sanctions 
or severe monitoring errors can prevent the formation of an effective IEA. For the 
remainder of this analysis we assume that f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ≥ (c − b) so that an effective 
IEA can form. Since c > b, this condition clearly requires ρ1 + ρ2 < 1. 
 
3.3 Treaty Stage 
 
In this stage members of an IEA agree to abate their emissions and to fund the monitor 
provided that these decisions maximize their joint welfare. Because we assume that 
each country’s abatement decision is not directly observable by other countries, 
members of an IEA cannot credibly commit to abatement. This, of course, is the reason 
for monitoring. Each country that wishes to join an effective agreement is required to 
contribute funds to the monitor. These payments are perfectly observed, so a country is 
not able to promise to make the payment and then fail to do so. 
 
Each party’s contribution to the monitor, x, is endogenous, so we determine this value 
first. If an effective agreement is to form, each party would like to contribute as little as 
possible while providing the monitor with sufficient resources to maintain compliance 
with the agreement. This requires a payment x so that π f (1−ρ1−ρ2)−(c−b) ≥ 0 binds. 
Since π = xα from (6), the contribution to the monitor of an IEA that is required of all 
parties to the agreement is 
 
(8)     
 
Note that this payment decreases with the size of the sanction, f , and the marginal 
productivity of resources devoted to monitoring, α, but is increasing in the probabilities 
the monitor commits a Type I or Type II error, ρ1 and ρ2, and the gain from non-
compliance, c −b. Note further that π = xα = (c − b)/( f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is the equilibrium 
probability the monitor audits any member of an effective IEA in the enforcement stage 
of the game. Our assumptions that c > b, ρ1 + ρ2 < 1, and f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2) ≥ (c − b) 
guarantee that π ∈ (0, 1].  
 
Parties to an IEA will fund the monitor and jointly agree to abate their emissions only if 
they will be at least as well off as without an agreement. That is, again, abatement must 
be profitable for the members of the agreement. Given s parties to an agreement that 
each expects to earn wp(s)− x −πρ1 f = A +bs −c − x −πρ1 f if they abate their 
emissions, and an individual country’s welfare in the absence of an IEA, A, the minimum 
size profitable coalition is the smallest s such that A+bs −c−x −πρ1 f ≥ A. Substituting for 
x from (8) and rearranging terms yields the smallest profitable coalition when an IEA 
requires costly monitoring: 
 
(9)    
 
(The superscript ‘c’ is used to denote values when compliance with an IEA requires 
costly monitoring). If s ≥ scmin from the first stage of the game (the membership stage), 
the members of the coalition will agree to abate their emissions in the treaty stage of the 
game. Furthermore, each member pays x from (8) to the monitor in this stage and will 
comply with the terms of the agreement in stage three (the abatement stage). On the 
other hand, if s < scmin from the first stage, the members of the IEA maximize their joint 
welfare by not abating their emissions and not funding the monitor. Clearly, if s < sc 
min an effective IEA does not form and the game concludes. 
 
4 Properties of Self-enforcing IEAs that Require Costly Monitoring 
 
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game we have just described is either a 
self-enforcing agreement under which all members of the agreement abate their 
emissions, or an effective IEA does not form. For an IEA to form, profitable coalitions 
must exist, which they will as long as N ≥ scmin; that is, using (9), N ≥ (c+πρ1 f )/b+(c−
b)/(bαf (1−ρ1−ρ2)). In the model without costly monitoring of Sect. 2, profitable coalitions 
always exist because we assumed at the outset that N > c/b. However, since c > b and 
ρ1+ρ2 < 1, c/b is strictly less than (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)). This implies 
that while profitable coalitions always exist when monitoring is not costly, they may not 
exist when parties to an IEA must fund a monitor to maintain compliance with the 
agreement. Therefore, we have our first conclusion about the impact of costly 
monitoring on self-enforcing environmental agreements: 
 
Proposition 2 The circumstances under which an effective IEA will form are diminished 
by the need for costly compliance monitoring. 
 
That N ≥ (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is required for an effective IEA to 
form is simply a statement about whether international cooperation to limit a global 
pollutant can increase aggregate welfare when we take account of the costs of 
compliance monitoring. Note that (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is decreasing 
in the marginal productivity of monitoring resources, α, and the size of the sanction, f . 
Decreasing either of these parameters increases the payment cooperators pay to 
monitor an agreement, leading to a decrease in the set of opportunities for an effective 
IEA. Note also that (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is increasing in the 
probability the monitor commits either a Type I or Type II error, indicating that the 
presence of monitoring errors further reduces the circumstances under which an 
effective IEA will form. Finally, (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) is increasing in 
c and decreasing in b; hence, the set of circumstances under which an effective IEA will 
form is smaller when abatement costs are higher and when the individual benefit from 
abatement is lower. 
 
As with the IEA model without costly monitoring in Sect. 2, a self-enforcing IEA that 
requires costly monitoring is the coalition size that is both internally and externally 
stable. And like the model in Sect. 2, it is easy to demonstrate that the only internally 
and externally stable coalition is the smallest profitable coalition given by (9), provided 
that profitable coalitions actually exist. Therefore: 
 
Proposition 3 Let sc be the equilibrium number of members of a self-enforcing 
agreement when monitoring for compliance with the agreement is costly. Then, 
 
(10)   
 
provided that N ≥ scmin. If N < scmin, there are no profitable coalitions and an effective 
self-enforcing agreement will not form. 
 
Comparing Proposition 3 to Proposition 1 allows us to determine how costly monitoring 
affects the equilibrium number of members of an IEA. When an agreement with costly 
monitoring forms, (10) indicates that the equilibrium size of the coalition sc is the least s 
for which s ≥ (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)). When an IEA does not require 
costly monitoring, (5) indicates that the size of the coalition snc is the least s for which s 
≥ c/b. Recall that 1 − ρ1 − ρ2 > 0 is required for an agreement with costly monitoring to 
form. Therefore, (c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) > c/b implies sc ≥ snc, and 
our next proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 If an effective IEA that is costly to monitor forms, the number of parties to 
the agreement will be no less, and will typically be greater, than if the IEA did not 
require costly monitoring. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. Since funding the monitor of an 
IEA is an additional cost of joining the agreement, more countries are required to 
participate and abate their emissions to make the agreement profitable. This produces 
the seemingly paradoxical result that costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher 
environmental quality. 
 
Generally speaking, participation in an IEA increases with the costs of participation and 
decreases with the benefit that participation provides to all the countries. Thus, 
participation with an effective IEA that is costly to monitor increases with a country’s 
abatement cost, c, and decreases with the individual benefit of some country’s 
abatement, b. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, any change in an 
enforcement parameter that increases the costs of monitoring will result in greater 
participation, as long as the IEA remains viable. Thus, participation and environmental 
quality increase with decreases in the marginal productivity of monitoring resources, α, 
and the sanction for noncompliance, f . Moreover, because monitoring inaccuracy 
increases the costs of maintaining compliance with an effective IEA, participation and 
environmental quality increase with monitoring inaccuracy as long as this does not 
prevent the formation of an IEA. 
 
5 Costly Monitoring of IEAs and Aggregate Welfare 
 
In this section we examine the differences in aggregate welfare under self-enforcing 
IEAs that are costly to monitor and under those for which compliance can be enforced 
without cost. Costly monitoring produces two countervailing effects on aggregate 
welfare. The first effect is the cost of monitoring itself which, holding participation with 
an IEA constant, diminishes aggregate welfare. However, costly monitoring can produce 
greater participation and higher environmental quality, which increases aggregate 
welfare. We demonstrate that it is possible that the latter effect dominates the former so 
that costly monitoring of international cooperation actually produces greater aggregate 
welfare. 
 
Given sc parties to an agreement that each earn wp(sc) − x − πρ1 f = A + bsc − c − x − 
πρ1 f , and N − sc free-riding countries that each earn wnp(sc) = A + bsc, aggregate 
welfare when cooperation requires costly monitoring is 
 
(11)    
Recall that the superscript ‘c’ identifies variables and functions when compliance with an 
IEA requires costly monitoring. For convenience, let us assume that sc is continuous. 
Then, from (10), sc = (c+πρ1 f ) _(b + (c − b)_ /(bαf (1−ρ1 −ρ2)) as long as it is not 
greater than N. Substitute this and x = (c − b)/(α f (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) from (8) into Wc(sc) to 
obtain 
 
(12)    
 
Aggregate welfare when a self-enforcing IEA does not require costly monitoring is 
Wnc(snc) = N A + snc(Nb − c). Allowing snc to be continuous, substitute snc = c/b from 
(5) into Wnc(snc) to obtain 
 
(13)     
 
Now subtract (13) from (12): 
 
 
 
Since the first term of Wc(sc)−Wnc(snc) is positive by assumption, the sign of Wc(sc)− 
Wnc(snc) is equal to the sign of the term in hard brackets, which provides our next 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 5 Costly monitoring of an IEA results in higher aggregate welfare if and 
only If 
 
(14)         
 
Proposition 5 indicates that costly monitoring of an effective IEA produces higher 
aggregate welfare when the number of potential parties to the agreement is large 
enough. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how Wc(sc) and Wnc(snc) vary with the number of potential parties 
to an IEA and with the accuracy of compliance monitoring. To draw this graph we have 
assumed, without loss of generality, that A = 0. Aggregate welfare when an IEA does 
not require costly monitoring, Wnc(snc), is zero for N ≤ c/b. For N > c/b, Wnc(snc) is 
positive and Eq. (13) indicates that it increases linearly at rate c. The size of a self-
enforcing IEA does not change as N increases; it remains constant at c/b. However, 
aggregate welfare increases with N because increasing N means we are increasing the 
number of free-riding countries, each of which benefits from the abatement efforts of the 
c/b parties to the agreement. 
 
The dashed function in Fig. 1 denoted Wc(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) is aggregate welfare for a 
self-enforcing IEA that is costly to monitor and monitoring is perfectly accurate. The 
dotted function, Wc(sc|ρ1 +ρ2 > 0), is aggregate welfare for a self-enforcing IEA that is 
costly to monitor and monitoring is inaccurate. Note that Wc(sc), with and without 
monitoring errors, is equal to zero for a larger range of N than Wnc(snc). This follows 
because cooperative 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 A comparison of aggregate welfare under self-enforcing international environmental 
agreements that require costly monitoring and aggregate welfare under agreements that do not 
require costly monitoring 
 
abatement efforts that require costly monitoring increase aggregate welfare under a 
smaller set of circumstances than when cooperation does not require monitoring 
(Proposition 2). 
 
If monitoring is perfectly accurate and N ≥ c/b + (c − b)/(bαf ), the coalition sc = c/b +(c −
b)(bαf ) forms and aggregate welfare increases with N at rate c +(c −b)/(α f ). For N ≥ c/b
−(c−b)/(bαf ), the relationship between Wc(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) and Wnc(snc) depends on 
the positive welfare effect of higher abatement when an IEA must be monitored 
(because sc > snc from Proposition 4) and the negative welfare effect of the costs of 
monitoring. The level of N where Wc(sc|ρ1 = ρ2 = 0) and Wnc(snc) intersect is 2c/b + (c 
− b)/(bαf ). Therefore, for N ∈ [c/b + (c − b)/(bαf ), 2c/b + (c − b)/(bαf )), the monitoring-
cost effect dominates the higher-abatement effect so that aggregate welfare is lower 
when the equilibrium IEA requires costly monitoring. However, when N exceeds 2c/b + 
(c − b)/(bαf ) the higher-abatement effect dominates the monitoring-cost effect so that 
aggregate welfare is higher when compliance requires costly monitoring. 
 
Monitoring errors further reduce the set of circumstance under which an effective IEA 
will form. For a large enough N, it is straightforward to show that Wnc(snc) and 
Wc(sc|ρ1+ρ2 > 0) intersect at N = (2c + πρ1 f )/b + (c − b)/(bαf (1 − ρ1 − ρ2)). For N 
greater than this value, costly and inaccurate monitoring of an IEA leads to higher 
aggregate welfare than if the IEA did not require monitoring. Moreover, Eq. (12) 
indicates that when Wc(sc|ρ1+ρ2 > 0) is positive it rises more quickly than Wc(sc|ρ1 = 
ρ2 = 0). Therefore, monitoring inaccuracy results in higher aggregate welfare than 
under perfectly accurate monitoring if N is large enough. The reason for this 
counterintuitive result is the now familiar monitoring cost/abatement tradeoff. Monitoring 
inaccuracy reduces aggregate welfare because it leads to higher monitoring costs, but 
inaccuracy also increases aggregate welfare because it leads to higher abatement. The 
latter effect dominates when the number of potential parties to an IEA is large enough. 
 
6 Self-enforcing IEAs with Costly Monitoring and Reputation Effects 
 
Up to this point we have assumed that an enforcement body of an IEA can impose a 
sanction on noncompliant members. Given the possibility that a violator may simply 
refuse to pay a sanction, which we discussed in Sect. 3, we now examine the 
consequences of an alternative model that includes reputation sanctions that cannot be 
avoided. Modeling costly reputation effects that result from violating the terms of an IEA 
forces us to also consider the possibility that countries that refuse to join an IEA in the 
first place may also suffer a deterioration of their reputation as cooperative members of 
the international community. Therefore, we now let f denote a sanction that is the value 
of a member country’s reputation loss when it violates an IEA, and let g be the value of 
a country’s reputation loss when it refuses to join an IEA. Since it is unreasonable to 
assume that all countries suffer a loss of reputation when no country joins an IEA, 
assume that g = 0 when an IEA does not form. 
 
The noncompliance reputation loss, f , enters our costly monitoring model in the same 
way as before. Thus, all changes in our results are due solely to the inclusion of the 
non-participation reputation loss, g. Moreover, as we demonstrate below, the primary 
effect of this non-participation sanction is that it can be large enough to induce full 
participation with an IEA that does not require costly monitoring. It is only in this case 
that there are substantive changes in the results we have obtained thus far. On the 
other hand, when a model of costless monitoring and a non-participation sanction 
predicts less than full participation, all of our qualitative results about the impacts of 
costly monitoring on the levels of IEA participation, environmental quality, and 
aggregate welfare continue to hold. 
 
We start by revising the welfare functions in (2) to include the non-participation sanction 
g. For s ≥ 1, the new welfare functions when compliance with an IEA does not require 
costly monitoring are now: 
 
(15)      
 
As before, w^p(0) = w^np(0) = A. Note that 
 
 
 
Suppose for now that b + g − c ≥ 0. Then wp(s) ≥ wnp(s − 1) for all s > 1, indicating that 
if more than one country joins an IEA, then all other countries will join as well. By 
assumption, no country will unilaterally abate its emissions because b − c < 0; however, 
since Nb > c, each country is better off if they all form an IEA to abate their emissions 
than if none do. Therefore, when the reputation loss from not participating with an IEA is 
large enough so that b + g − c ≥ 0, a self-enforcing IEA that does not require costly 
monitoring for compliance will involve all countries. Suppose now that the non-
participation loss is not so large; that is, suppose that b+g−c < 0. As with the model of 
Sect. 2, since b < c, Nb > c, and wp(s) is increasing in s, there exist coalition sizes that 
are strictly greater than one and weakly less that N that are profitable. Furthermore, 
using (15) and noting that wnp(0) = A, the smallest of these profitable coalitions is 
sncmin = min {s|wp(s) ≥ wnp(0)} = min {s|s ≥ c/b}, which is identical to the minimum 
sized profitable coalition in the model of Sect. 2 (see Eq. (3)). Moreover, this is the only 
internally and externally stable coalition. Hence, when b+g−c < 0, Proposition 1 
continues to hold so that the equilibrium number of members of an IEA that does not 
require costly monitoring is snc = min {s|s ≥ c/b}. The only modification to Proposition 1 
needed when non-participation produces a reputation loss is to state that snc = N when 
b+g−c ≥ 0. 
 
Let us now determine how reputation sanctions affect the self-enforcing number of 
members of an IEA that requires costly compliance monitoring. As detailed in Sect. 3, 
the game entails four stages that proceed in exactly the same way, except that now if a 
member is determined to be noncompliant, the monitor makes this information public 
and the violator suffers a reputation loss, the value of which is f . Despite this re-
interpretation of f , it enters the model exactly as in the model of Sect. 3. Therefore, a 
party of an IEA complies with its terms if and only if π f (1−ρ1−ρ2) ≥ c−b (Eq. (7)), and 
provided that f (1−ρ1−ρ2) ≥ (c−b), each member country must contribute x = (c − b)/(α f 
(1 − ρ1 − ρ2)) to the monitor to maintain compliance with the agreement (Eq. (8)). 
Moreover, the minimum size profitable coalition is the same sc min that is specified 
inEq. (9), and profitable coalitions exist if N ≥ scmin. 
 
The main effect of modeling reputation sanctions for both violations and non-
participation is that the non-participation sanction may be large enough to produce full 
compliance with an IEA, just as in the model without costly compliance monitoring. 
From Sect. 3, a party’s expected welfare from complying with an IEA with s members 
that requires costly monitoring is A + bs −c − πρ1 f − x. If instead the country decides not 
to be a member of the IEA it suffers the reputation loss of g and earns A + b(s − 1) − g 
(provided that s > 1). The IEA obtains full participation if A + bs − c − πρ1 f − x ≥ A + b(s 
− 1) − g, which reduces to b + g −c −(πρ1 f + x) ≥ 0. Recall that without the need for 
costly monitoring, full participation is realized when b + g − c ≥ 0. Since πρ1 f + x > 0, if 
the non-participation reputation loss is large enough to promote full participation with 
costly compliance monitoring, then it is large enough to promote full participation when 
costly monitoring is not needed. Therefore, when b + g − c − (πρ1 f + x) ≥ 0, the self-
enforcing IEA involves all countries whether compliance monitoring is costly or not. 
 
However, in all cases in which (b + g) − c − (πρ1 f + x) < 0, the non-participation loss is 
not sufficient to induce full compliance with an IEA. Under these circumstances, it is 
straightforward to demonstrate that Propositions 2 and 3 of Sect. 4 are unchanged. That 
is, costly monitoring limits the circumstance under which an effective IEA forms, but 
when one does form its membership is sc, as specified in Eq. (10). However, because 
the nonparticipation reputation loss can produce full participation with an IEA, we must 
modify Proposition 4 when this sanction is present. There are two circumstances under 
which an effective IEA that requires costly monitoring does not involve higher 
participation than if it did not require costly monitoring. One is the case in which the non-
participation reputation loss is so large that an IEA involves full participation whether 
compliance monitoring is costly or not. Recall that this is the case when b + g − c − (πρ1 
f + x) ≥ 0. The other case is when b + g − c − (πρ1 f + x)<0, but b + g − c < 0. In this 
case, an IEA would involve full participation if it did not require costly monitoring, but 
there would be less than full participation if it does require costly compliance monitoring. 
When both noncompliance and non-participation incur reputation losses, costly 
compliance monitoring of an effective IEA produces greater participation only when the 
non-participation reputation loss is low enough so that b + g − c < 0. 
 
The fact that a loss for not participating with an IEA can produce full participation also 
causes us to modify our conclusions in Sect. 5 about the welfare effects of costly 
monitoring. There we noted that because costly compliance monitoring can increase the 
number of participants and environmental quality, it can also produce higher aggregate 
welfare as well because the increase in environmental quality offsets the costs of 
monitoring under some circumstances. With both noncompliance and non-participation 
sanctions, this result continues to hold as long as participation is less than complete 
when costly monitoring is not needed. However, when a non-participation sanction is 
large enough to induce full compliance when monitoring is not needed, participation and 
environmental quality cannot be greater when costly monitoring is required. In this case 
costly monitoring unequivocally reduces aggregate welfare because the costs of 
monitoring an IEA will never be offset by an increase in environmental quality. 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
 
We have analyzed games of self-enforcing IEAs when parties to such agreements 
finance an independent institution to monitor compliance with the IEA. We have shown 
that costly monitoring limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to 
control a transboundary pollutant will increase aggregate welfare. However, when an 
effective IEA does form, participation with the agreement and environmental quality can 
be greater than when an IEA does not require costly monitoring. In fact, under some 
circumstances, costly monitoring of an IEA is associated with higher aggregate welfare 
as well -not for the parties to an IEA, however, but for the countries that choose to free 
ride on the agreement. 
 
Most of our results are robust to the problem of inaccurate monitoring and to different 
types of sanctions. We demonstrate that monitoring inaccuracy can further reduce the 
set of international environmental problems that can be addressed with an 
environmental agreement, but when an agreement is worthwhile, monitoring inaccuracy 
can produce higher participation and environmental quality. We also examined two 
types of sanctions—one that is imposed on noncompliant parties by an enforcement 
body, while the other involves reputation losses that are incurred by both non-
compliance with an agreement and by not participating with the agreement in the first 
place. The qualitative results of both specifications are the same, except when the non-
participation loss is so large that it induces full participation with an agreement. 
 
Our results have important implications for multilateral management of environmental 
externalities. Assuming away monitoring and enforcement problems related to IEAs 
artificially enlarges the scope of mutually beneficial agreements between countries, and 
may artificially reduce the number of participating countries that are necessary to make 
these agreements worthwhile. In other words, for some international environmental 
problems, monitoring costs either require more members for an IEA to come into effect 
or they render mutual cooperation inefficient. 
 
The models developed in this paper can and should be extended to include additional 
features. An obvious extension would be to recognize the real-world heterogeneity of 
countries involved in international environmental relations. Other features of 
international cooperation such as side payments, issue linkage, and minimum 
participation requirements that others have addressed, can and should be examined in 
the context of costly monitoring of these agreements. Certainly there are many 
extensions that should be addressed to gain a more complete picture of how costly 
monitoring affects voluntary coalition formation to protect the international environment. 
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